Abstract. This paper is centered on the family of Dung's finite argumentation frameworks when the attacks relation is symmetric (and nonempty and irreflexive). We show that while this family does not contain any well-founded framework, every element of it is both coherent and relatively grounded. Then we focus on the acceptability problems for the various semantics introduced by Dung, yet generalized to sets of arguments. We show that only two distinct forms of acceptability are possible when the considered frameworks are symmetric. Those forms of acceptability are quite simple, but tractable; this contrasts with the general case for which all the forms of acceptability are intractable (except for the ones based on grounded or naive extensions).
Introduction
Modelling argumentation is known as a major issue of many AI problems, including defeasible reasoning and some forms of dialogue between agents (see e.g., [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ). In a nutshell, argumentative reasoning is concerned with the interaction of arguments. A key notion for any theory of argumentation is the acceptability one: intuitively, an argument is considered acceptable if it can be argued successfully against attacking arguments. Formally, the acceptability of an argument (resp. a set of arguments taken as a whole) is characterized by the membership (resp. the containment) of it to some selected sets of arguments, referred to as extensions.
Several theories of argumentation have been proposed so far (see among others [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] ). In Elvang-Gøransson et al. ' s theory (refined and extended by several authors, including [7, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] ), one considers in the beginning a set of assumptions and some background knowledge; then an argument is a pair consisting of a statement (the conclusion of the argument) and a (often minimal) subset of assumptions (the support of the conclusion) which is consistent with the background knowledge and such that the conclusion is a logical consequence of it and the background knowledge. Several forms of interaction between arguments have been investigated, including among others the rebuttal relation (an argument rebuts a second one when the conclusion of the former is equivalent to the negation of the conclusion of the latter). In Dung's approach 1 [6] , no assumption is made about the nature of an argument (it can be a statement supported by some assumptions like in the theory introduced by Elvang-Gøransson et al. but this is not mandatory). What really matters is the way arguments interact w.r.t. the attacks relation. In contrast to Elvang-Gøransson et al. ' s theory, Dung's theory of argumentation is not concerned with the generation of arguments; arguments and the way they interact are considered as initial data of any argumentation framework. Several notions of extensions have been defined by Dung, reflecting several reasons according to which arguments can be taken together. A major feature of Dung's theory is that it encompasses many approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming as special cases.
In this paper, we focus on the family of finite argumentation frameworks obtained by requiring the attacks relation to be symmetric; we also assume that the attacks relation is not empty (which is not so strong an assumption since the argumentation frameworks which violate it are trivial ones: no interactions between arguments exist) and that it is irreflexive; the latter assumption is also sensible since an argument which attacks itself is in some sense paradoxical and the problem of reasoning with paradoxical statements is hard by itself but mainly independent from the argumentation issue. Thus, paradoxical statements are typically not viewed as arguments (for instance, it cannot be the case that the support of a conclusion contradicts the conclusion in Elvang-Gøransson et al.'s approach). The symmetry requirement is also not so strong; for instance, the rebuttal relation in Elvang-Gøransson et al.'s theory is clearly symmetric.
Our contribution is twofold. We show that while no symmetric argumentation framework is also well-founded, every symmetric argumentation framework is both coherent and relatively grounded. Then we focus on the acceptability problems for the various semantics introduced by Dung, yet generalized to sets of arguments. We show that only two distinct forms of acceptability are possible when considering symmetric frameworks. Finally, we show that those forms of acceptability are quite simple, but tractable for symmetric frameworks, while they are intractable in the general case (except for the ones based on grounded or naive extensions).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section2, we recall the main definitions and results pertaining to Dung's theory of argumentation. In Section 3, we focus on symmetric argumentation frameworks and present our contribution. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. " 0 A @ B 4
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is depicted on Figure 1 . One can observe that is a symmetric relation; clearly, this is not always the case for Dung's frameworks but this choice is motivated by the desire to take advantage of ¡ £ ¢ as a running example throughout the paper. A first important notion is the notion of acceptability: an argument % is acceptable w.r.t. a set of arguments whenever it is defended by the set, i.e., every argument which attacks % is attacked by an element of the set. In the graph theory literature, a set of vertices which is acceptable w.r.t. itself is said to be semidominant.
A second important notion is the notion of absence of conflicts. Intuitively, two arguments should not be considered together whenever one of them attacks the other one. [3] . In the graph theory literature, such conflict-free sets are also called independent sets.
Definition 3 (conflict-free sets). Let
Requiring the absence of conflicts and the form of autonomy captured by selfacceptability leads to the notion of admissible set. 
Definition 4 (admissible sets). Let
. 
Finally, several notions of acceptability of an argument (or more generally a set of arguments) can be defined by requiring the membership to one (credulous acceptability) or every extension (skeptical acceptability) of a specific kind. Obviously enough, credulous acceptability and skeptical acceptability w.r.t. the grounded extension coincide, since the grounded extension of an argumentation framework is unique.
Among other things, Dung has shown that every argumentation framework ¡ £ ¢ has at least one preferred extension, while it may have zero, one or many stable extensions.
The purest argumentation frameworks ¡ £ ¢ in Dung's theory are those for which all the notions of acceptability coincide. This means that ¡ £ ¢ has a unique complete extension (the grounded one), which is also stable and preferred.
Definition 7. An argumentation framework
is well-founded if and only if there does not exist an infinite sequence
Proposition 1. Every well-founded argumentation framework has exactly one complete extension which is grounded, preferred and stable.
Dung has provided a sufficient condition for an argumentation framework ¡ ¢ to satisfy this requirement, the well-foundation of
be a finite argumentation framework.
¡ £ ¢ is wellfounded if there is no cycle in the digraph
Dung has also shown that every stable extension is preferred and every preferred extension is complete; however, none of the converse inclusions holds. When all the preferred extensions of an argumentation framework are stable ones, the framework is said to be coherent: , the notion of credulous (resp. skeptical) acceptability w.r.t. the preferred arguments coincides with the notion of credulous (resp. skeptical) acceptability w.r.t. the stable arguments.
Definition 8 (coherent argumentation frameworks). Let
Since the grounded extension of ¡ £ ¢ is the least complete extension of it, it is included in every preferred extension of ¡ £ ¢ (hence in every stable extension of
¡ £ ¢
). This shows that the notion of acceptability w.r.t. the grounded extension is always at least as demanding as any form of credulous or skeptical acceptability w.r.t. the preferred extensions or the stable ones (except for credulous acceptability w.r.t. the stable extensions when no such extensions exist since no argument can be accepted in that case for such semantics -note that such an exception cannot be the case when
Nevertheless, the grounded extension of ¡ ¢
is not always equal to the intersection of all its preferred extensions. Interesting argumentation frameworks are those for which this condition is satisfied:
Definition 9 (relatively grounded argumentation frameworks). Let
¡ £ ¢ is relatively grounded if and only if its grounded extension is equal to the intersection of all its preferred extensions.
Example 5 (Example 1 (cont'ed) ).
is relatively grounded.
In this case, the notion of skeptical acceptability w.r.t. the preferred extensions coincides with the notion of acceptability w.r.t. the grounded extension.
Definitions and properties
Let us now make precise the argumentation frameworks we are interested in.
Definition 10 (symmetric argumentation frameworks).
A symmetric argumentation framework is a finite argumentation framework
where is assumed symmetric, nonempty and irreflexive.
Example 6 (Example 1 (cont'ed) ).
¡ £ ¢
is a symmetric argumentation framework.
First of all, it is easy to show that no symmetric argumentation framework is among the purest ones: Since every symmetric argumentation framework has a preferred extension, every symmetric argumentation framework has a stable extension, which is necessarily nonempty. Actually, this is an easy consequence of a more general result from graph theory stating that symmetric graphs are kernel perfect. This means that every induced subgraph of a symmetric graph has a kernel. As a consequence, there are at most two distinct forms of acceptability for symmetric argumentation frameworks: all the forms of skeptical acceptability coincide with the notion of acceptability w.r.t. the grounded extension; credulous acceptability w.r.t. preferred extensions and credulous acceptability w.r.t. stable extensions coincide with credoulous acceptability w.r.t. naive extensions. Nevertheless, according to Proposition 6 credulous acceptability for single arguments is not so interesting since it trivializes for symmetric argumentation frameworks.
Accordingly, one has to consider more general acceptability problems if one wants to get more than one semantics, which is expected here; indeed, skeptical acceptability is rather poor since it characterizes as acceptable only those arguments of ¡ which are not attacked.
Acceptability problems and complexity issues
This is why we turn to acceptability problems for sets of arguments, i.e., the question is now to determine whether or not it is reasonable to accept some arguments together:
Definition 11 (acceptability problems).

ACCEPTABILITY
E is the following decision problem (also viewed as the language of its positive instances in the usual way):
-Input: A finite argumentation framework We can easily complete previous complexity results for skeptical acceptability of single arguments [25, 26] :
Proposition 10. The following complexity results hold:
Proof. Clearly enough, considering sets of arguments has no impact w.r.t. skeptical acceptability whatever the underlying semantics: a set a of arguments is skeptically acceptable if and only if a is a subset of all the extensions under consideration if and only if every element of a is skeptically acceptable. Hence the complexity of skeptical acceptability for sets of arguments coincides with the corresponding complexity of skeptical acceptability for single arguments, as identified by Dunne and Bench-Capon (when the set of arguments is finite and the attacks relation is not empty) [26] . Now, since the grounded extension of an argumentation framework ¡ £ ¢ is the intersection of all its complete extensions, it also comes that the two languages ACCEPTABILITY 
The picture is not the same when credulous acceptability is considered since it can be the case that both arguments 
because this set is not conflict-free.
Nevertheless, considering sets of arguments instead of arguments alone does not lead to a complexity shift:
Proposition 11. The following complexity results hold:
Proof. The equality ACCEPTABILITY . It is easy to show that the check step can be done in (deterministic) polynomial time. The hardness results are direct consequences of the fact that their restrictions to the case a contains a single argument are already NP-hard [25, 26] . Finally checking whether a set a of argument belongs to a naive extension is equivalent to checking whether a is conflict-free, which can be done easily in polynomial time. To sum up, the various semantics in Dung's theory applied to symmetric frameworks lead to consider a set of arguments as acceptable when (1) every element of it is not attacked (the skeptical acceptability) or (2) it is conflict-free (the credulous acceptability). In both cases, acceptability can be decided in an efficient way.
Conclusion
We have studied the properties offered by symmetric argumentation frameworks, under the (quite realistic) assumptions that the set of arguments is finite and the attacks relation is nonempty and irreflexive. Such frameworks are shown coherent and relatively grounded. This ensures that the various notions of acceptability proposed so far reduce at most to two. Extending them to sets of arguments, one obtains two notions of acceptability which are rather simple in essence but tractable; we have shown that this contrasts with the general case for which all the generalized forms of acceptability are intractable (under the usual assumptions of complexity theory), except for the ones based on grounded or naive extensions.
This work calls for several perspectives. One of them consists in investigating other preference criteria as a basis for additional semantics for argumentation frameworks. Indeed, refining preferred extensions can prove valuable whenever skeptical (resp. credulous) acceptability w.r.t. preferred extensions is considered too cautious (resp. too liberal). For instance, one can select the preferred extensions which are maximal w.r.t. cardinality. On can also associate to every preferred set a of arguments of ¡ £ ¢ the sum (or the maximum) of the numbers of attacks against each element of a ; on this ground, one can prefer the admissible sets associated to the least numbers if one thinks that a set of arguments which is not attacked is better than a set of arguments which is massively attacked. One can also adhere to the opposite point of view and prefer in a Popperian style sets of arguments which are robust enough to survive to many attacks. A second perspective consists in investigating the acceptability issue from the complexity point of view whenever a limited amount of non symmetric attacks is allowed. Finally, it would be interesting to point out other graph-theoretic properties for argumentation frameworks which would ensure tractable inference under various semantics.
